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Household income, education, fertility, and individual ability are closely linked to 
each  other,  and  their  interactions  likely  affect  economic  growth  and  income 
distribution. In fact, it is widely known that poor parents tend to have more children 
and  provide  them  with  low  education,  while  affluent  parents  tend  to  have  fewer 
children and provide them with  high education  (see Becker and Tomes (1976) and 
Hanushek  (1992)).  In  addition,  differential  fertility  among  households  potentially 
affects  economic  growth,  reflecting  a  negative  correlation  between  fertility  and 
education levels. Moreover, education may sustain or even widen income inequality 
with successive generations, because children born to rich parents can become even 
richer through higher education, while those born to poor parents cannot. 
These dynamics, however, are likely to depend heavily on the degree of ability 
transmission  from  parents  to  children,  as  already  pointed  out  by  many  preceding 
researches, beginning with a seminal paper by Becker and Tomes (1979). It may well 
be that income  inequality keeps widening  if  ability  is strongly transmitted between 
generations. If ability is randomly transmitted, by contrast, it would at least partially 
offset intergenerational transmission of income inequality. It is also of great interest to 
examine how the dynamics of economic growth and income distribution are affected 
by  policy  measures  to  financially  support  childcare  or  education,  explicitly  taking 
ability transmission into account. 
There have been many studies, including Galor and Zhang (1997), which discuss 
the interactions among income inequality, differential fertility, and economic growth. 
Kremer  and  Chen  (2002)  empirically  examined  a  correlation  between  income 
inequality and differential fertility, using cross-country data. They found that inequality 2 
 
tends to have a positive relationship with differential fertility. De la Croix and Doepke 
(2003) examined the relationship among economic inequality, differential fertility, and 
growth  by  using  growth  regression  models.  They  found  a  significantly  negative 
association between differential fertility and growth, and their regressions revealed that 
income  inequality  as  measured  by  Gini  coefficients  does  not  affect  growth,  once 
differential fertility is included as an explanatory variable.   
In addition, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) developed an overlapping generations 
(OLG) model with a channel from inequality to growth, showing that inequality affects 
growth through its effect on human capital and fertility. They showed that economies 
with  less  equitable  income  distribution  raise  differential  fertility,  decelerate  human 
capital  accumulation,  and  lower  economic  growth;  they  thereby  highlighted  the 
importance of income redistribution through tax and educational subsidy. Their studies, 
however, did not explore the dynamics of ability transmission from parents to children, 
which is most likely to affect education investment and income distribution. 
   The importance of ability transmission in human capital has been demonstrated in 
an  analogical  way,  as  well,  as  genetic  versus  environmental  factors  in  biology, 
following Becker (1967). In this approach, ability corresponds to the genetic influences 
with  which  children  are  endowed  by  their  parents,  while  parents’  choice  of  child 
education  corresponds  to  environmental  factors  for  human  capital.  A  return  from 
human  capital  investment  is  determined  largely  by  a  combination  of  ability  and 
education.   
In  addition,  information  about  ability  affects  education:  a  child’s  higher  ability 
increases parents’ demand for education due to a higher rate of return from it. Using 
this approach, some recent studies focused on the relation between individual ability 
and  human  capital.  For  example,  Han  and  Mulligan  (2001)  found  that  earnings 3 
 
mobility tends to be greater in economies with less variance in ability. It may well be 
that a lower correlation between parent and child abilities leads to a greater earnings 
mobility.   
   Along  with  these  theoretical  and  empirical  studies,  there  has  been  a  growing 
number of researches on the impacts of educational policies on economic growth and 
income distribution, including Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Iyigun (1999), Maoz 
and Moav (1999), Fender and Wang (2003), and Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003) 
(2004). It is reasonable that efficiency and redistributive aspects of educational policies 
have been focused on, considering that education enhances human capital for society 
as a whole and, at the same time, causes income transfer across individuals through 
publicly financing its costs. The key limitation to these studies is, however, that they 
assume  fertility to be exogenous, while  it may  well  both affect and be affected by 
intergenerational ability transmission and income distribution among households.   
   Following on from these preceding studies and considering their limitations, we 
explore  an  OLG  model  that  explicitly  investigates  all  ability  transmission,  fertility 
difference, human capital, economic growth, and income distribution. Starting with the 
initial distribution of  individual abilities, our model describes  how individuals with 
different abilities choose education levels for their education and how their choices 
affect  economic  growth  and  income  distribution  through  ability  transmission.  By 
utilizing this dynamic model, we examine how policy measures such as educational 
subsidy,  childcare  allowance,  and  family  allowances  affect  economic  growth  and 
income distribution. The simulation results show that educational subsidy can  both 
increase economic growth and reduce income inequality, especially if ability is fully 
transmitted  from  parents  to  children.  In  contrast  with  educational  subsidy,  raising 
childcare allowance or family allowance has limited impact on growth and inequality. 4 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
analysis for intuitive understanding. Section 3 establishes a main model for simulation 
analysis.  Section  4  describes  simulation  results.  Finally,  Section  5  presents  some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2. Simple analysis 
 
To make discussions intuitively understandable, we start with a very simple model, 
in which there exist only two generations: the parent generation (generation 0) and the 





H). The numbers of individuals in the parent generation with high 
and low ability are set equal to 1 each, and the wages per ability of the high and low 
educated  workers  are  denoted  by  w
H  and  w
L,  respectively.  We  assume  unisexual 
reproduction and that the children born from the same parent all have the same ability. 
High-ability parents have high-ability children at the probability p and low-ability ones 
at  the  probability  1-p  (0  <  p  <  1).  Similarly,  low-ability  parents  have  high-ability 
children at the probability 1-p and low-ability ones at the probability p. The parameter, 
p, indicates the degree of ability transmission from parents to children. If p = 1, the 
ability of the parent  is  fully transmitted to their children. If  p = 0.5, the ability  is 
randomly transmitted. 
Suppose further that (1) only children with rich parents and high ability can receive 
high education (in other words, high education requires both own high ability and high 
household income)
1; (2) income is determined by the product of ability and education, 
that is,  w
ix
j (i, j = L, H); and (3) as an initial condition, all parents with high (low) 
                                                   
1  This constraint will be relaxed in Section 3. 5 
 
ability  are  high  (low)-educated  and,  hence,  rich  (poor).  We  also  assume  that  each 
parent has one child, meaning that this simple analysis does not discuss fertility. 
In this model, there are two types of rich parents: those who have children with 
high ability (x
H) and those who have children with low ability (x
L). Rich parents who 
have high-ability children—the proportion of such parents is p—provide their children 
with  high  education.  The  number  and  income  of  their  children  are  p  and  w
Hx
H, 
respectively.  Rich  parents  who  have  low-ability  children—the  proportion  of  such 
parents is 1-p—provide their children with low education. The proportion and income 
of their children are 1-p and w
Lx
L, respectively.   
   Similarly, there are two types of poor parents: those who have high-ability children 
and those who have low-ability children. The proportions of each type of parent are 1-p 
and p. Given that poor parents can provide their children with only low education, their 
children are two types: those who have high ability and are low-educated and those 






Hence, the child generation consists of three types of children: (1) those who have 
high  ability  and  are  high-educated,  (2)  those  who  have  high  ability  and  are 
low-educated,  and  (3)  those  who  have  low  ability  and  are  low-educated.  Their 
composition is as follows: 
High-income children (with income x
Hw
H):  p 
Middle-income children (with income x
Hw
L): 1-p 
Low-income children (with income x
Lw
L):  (1-p) + p = 1   
   If the government implements policy measures to financially support education for 
high-ability  children  born  to  poor  parents—the  proportion  of  such  children  is 6 
 
1-p—these  can  receive  high  education.





H with no policy measures, As a result, the composition of the child 
generation’s population changes to the following:   
High-income children (with income x
Hw
H): p + (1-p) = 1 
Middle-income children (with income x
Hw
L): 0 
Low-income children (with income x
Lw
L): (1-p) + p= 1. 
To illustrate, suppose x
H = 1, x
L
 = 0.5, w
H
 = 2, w
L
 = 1. Then, before implementing 
policy measures, the mean and Gini coefficient of the child generation, denoted by μ1 
and GINI1, respectively, are calculated as 
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With educational subsidy, they turn to μ1
* and GINI1
* such that 
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Hence, we have μ1
* > μ1 for all p (0 < p < 1) and GINI1
* < GINI1 as long as p > 0.4. 
These results point to the possibility that the government can both increase economic 
growth and reduce income inequality, unless ability is reversely transmitted from the 
                                                   
2  For simplicity we ignore taxes to finance these policy measures for the parent generation. 7 
 
parent to children. Financial support for education provides high-ability children born 
to poor parents with more chances to receive high education, which raises the average 
income and shifts the income distribution toward the higher end.
3 
However, endogenous fertility  would  make the analysis  much  more complex , 
because  parents  are  likely  to  change  the  number  of  children  when  they  receive 
financial support from the governm ent. Hence,  in the next section,  we construct an 
OLG model  that incorporates ability transmission and endogenous fertility; we also 
consider  the  budget  constraint  of  the  government  that  finances  expenditures  by 
taxation. 
 
3. The model 
 
3.1 Individuals 
In this section, we construct an OLG model with the transmission of individual ability 
and endogenous fertility to examine the effect of educational subsidy and childcare and 
family allowances. Each generation lives for two periods: childhood and adulthood, and 
all decisions are made in the adult period of life. For simplicity, we assume unisexual 
reproduction and that all children born to the same parent share the same ability and are 
provided with the same level of education. 
Individual ability, xt, is distributed in the range between zero and one. The outcome 
of education choice depends on the child’s ability. If the parent provides the child with 
low education (
L
t e 1  ), the  child obtains a low wage  (per ability) (
L
t w 1  ) regardless of 
his/her  ability.  If  the  parent  provides the child with high education  (
H
t e 1  ), the  child 
                                                   
3  It should be noted, however, that this type of educational support cannot help low-ability individuals receive high 
education. 8 
 
obtains  a  high  wage  (
H
t w 1  )  at  the probability  xt+1  and  a  low  wage  (
L
t w 1  )  at  the 
probability of 1-xt+1, following de la Croix et al. (2003) and Hanushek et al. (2004). It 
should  be  noted  here  that  high  education  does  not  guarantee  a  high  wage  and  that 
high-ability  children are  more likely to benefit from high education than  low-ability 
children.   
The  budget  constraint  for  individuals  with  ability  xt  in  generation  t  who  choose 
education of level i for their children is expressed as 
            . 1 1 1 1 1 t t
j
t t t t t
i
t t t m n w kx c e n                 (1) 
Here, ξt is the basic cost of childrearing; ς is the parameter of the opportunity cost of 
childbearing;  δt  is  the  child  allowance;  ηt  is  the  wage  tax  rate;  k  is  the  aggregate 
productivity; and mt is the family allowance. The costs of high and low education, the 
basic  cost  of  childrearing,  and  the  child  allowance  are  proportional  to  the  average 
after-tax  income,  ,
A
t W while  the  family  allowance  is  proportional  to  the  average 
before-tax income, 
B
t W : 
,
A
t t W        (2) 
,
A
t t W        (3) 
,
B
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W     (8) 
where Nt
H
 (xt) and Nt
L
 (xt) represent the numbers of individuals with ability xt and high 
wages (wt
H) and low wages (wt
L), respectively, and θ, ξ, δ and m are positive parameters. 9 
 
As  for education costs, we assume that the government  gives  subsidies θt+1 to high 





discuss the dynamics of the population, Nt
H(xt) and Nt
L(xt), in Section 3.2. 
Each  individual  in  generation  t  cares  about  his  or  her own  consumption,  ct;  the 
number of children, nt+1; and the quality of children to maximize the utility. The quality 
of children is evaluated by the wage, w
i
t+1, which reflects human capital obtained by 
education. More specifically, if individuals with ability xt and the wage w
i
t provide their 
children with low education, 
L
t e 1  , then their expected utility is described as 






t t t e c e n w U U E              (9) 
1 , 1 , , 0             
considering that the children obtain a low wage,
L
t w 1  , regardless of their ability if they 
are provided with low education.   
It is reasonable to  suppose that individuals with higher income are more likely to 
prefer child quality to child  quantity; that is,  they are  more inclined  to have fewer 
children with more education. In this model, the cost of education is fixed and 
proportional to the average before-tax wage among the child generation (see equations 
(2) and (3)), meaning that education is more expensive for a poorer parent. In contrast, 
the opportunity cost of childrearing is proportional to the parent’s after-tax wage (see 
equation (1)). Hence, individuals with higher income may well have fewer children 
with higher education, all other things being equal. 
If an individual chooses high education for his/her children, then that individual’s 
expected utility is expressed as 








t t t e c e n w x w x U E                
  (10) 
as the children obtain a high wage, 
H
t w 1  , at the probability xt+1 and a low wage, 
L
t w 1  , 10 
 
at the probability 1- xt+1. 
Each individual determines the level of education for the children to maximize the 
expected utility, which is given by (9) or (10), under the budget constraint (1). If an 
individual chooses low education, the first order conditions for utility maximization are 
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t t e w x 1 , ,  , is calculated as   
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If an individual chooses high education for the children, the first order conditions 
for utility maximization are given as 
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t e w x U 1 , ,    denote the indirect utility functions for 
the cases where the children obtain high and low wages , respectively, we have the 
expected utility of an individual who chooses high education for his/her children: 
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    In  deciding  the  level  of  education,  an  individual  compares  expected  utilities 
obtained  from  high  and  low  education.  The  condition  under  which  the  individual 
chooses high education for his/her children is expressed as 11 
 








t t t e w x U e w x U E      (18)                                                
which is rewritten as 
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  (19) 
using  equations  (13)–(15).  This  condition  indicates  that  an  individual  is  likely  to 
choose high education if the child’s ability is observed to be high enough. Moreover, 
simple calculations show 0 1    
i
t t w x , indicating that children with high ability likely 
fail to receive high education if the parent is poor. 
 
3.2 Ability transmission and income distribution 
Following Hanushek et al. (2004), we assume the mechanism of ability transmission 
from the parent to the child: 
            1 , 0 , max min 3 2 1 1 t t t t u x x g x                                (20) 
where ut is a white noise that obeys the standard normal distribution at each period. This 
transmission mechanism keeps ability within the range of [0, 1] in any generation. If (ζ1, 
ζ2, ζ3) = (0, 1, 0), for instance, the parent’s ability is fully transmitted to the children. In 
the case of (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (-0.25, 0.5, 0.25), ability is only partly transmitted and has a 
downtrend with random fluctuations. 
By combining an individual’s utility maximization described in the previous section 
and the ability transmission mechanism given by equation (20), we derive the dynamics 
of  ability  and  income  distribution.  Let  Nt
H(xt)  and  Nt
L(xt)  denote  the  numbers  of 
individuals in generation t who have ability xt and obtain the high and low wages wt
H, 
wt
L, respectively. Each of them transmits his/her ability to his/her children through the 
mechanism expressed as equation (20). Due to the white noise, ut, even individuals with 12 
 
the same ability may have children with different abilities.   
Now, suppose that there are Ωt
H(xt+1, xt) individuals in generation t who have ability 
xt, a high wage  wt
H, and children with ability  xt+1. In the same way,  let Ωt
L(xt+1,  xt) 
denote the number of individuals in generation t who have ability x, a low wage wt
L, and 
children with ability xt+1. We have 0 ≤ Ωt
H(xt+1, xt) ≤ Nt
H(xt) and 0 ≤ Ωt
L(xt+1, xt) ≤ Nt
L(xt). 
Then, we denote the number of individuals in generation t+1 who have ability xt+1 and 
obtain a high wage wt
H as 
         
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  (21) 
where θ (q) is a Heaviside step function (and θ = 1 if q > 0; = 0 if q ≤ 0). The first term 
of  the  equation  (21)  represents the  number of  generation  t+1  who  have  ability  xt+1, 
receive  high education (
H
t e 1  ), and correspondingly  obtain  high wages (
H
t w 1  ), among 
those who have parents with high wages (wt
H).
4  Similarly, the second term indicates the 
number of individuals in generation  t+1 who have ability xt+1, receive high education, 
and correspondingly obtain high wages among those who have parents with low wages 
(wt
L).   
In the same way, we derive the number of individuals in generation t+1with ability 
xt+1 and low wage wt
L,   1 1   t
L
t x N   as 
                                                   




H(xt+1, xt) indicates the total number of individuals in generation t+1 
with ability xt+1 born to the parents with high wages wt
H. Among these individuals, only those with xt+1 ≥ 1  t x (xt, 
wt
H) can receive high education. Integrating them with respect to ability xt from zero to one yields the total number 
of individuals in generation t who receive high education. Finally, xt+1×100% of them obtain high wages.   13 
 
           
       
         



































t t t t t t
L
t
dx x x Ω e w x n x w x x
dx x x Ω e w x n w x x x x
dx x x Ω e w x n x w x x





    
     
    






0 1 1 1 1 1
1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
0 1 1 1 1 1
1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, , , ,
, , , , 1
, , , ,





   (22) 
The first term of the right-hand side of equation (22) indicates the number of individuals 
who receive high education but fail to obtain high wages among those who have parents 
with  high  wages  (wt
H).  The  second  term  indicates  the  number  of  individuals  who 
receive low education and hence obtain low wages in the same group. The third and 
fourth terms correspond to the first and second terms, respectively, among those who 
have parents with a low wage (wt
L). 
   Based  on  the  dynamics  of  (21)  and  (22),  the  total  number  of  individuals  in 
generation t with ability xt, Nt (xt), is given as   




t t t x N x N x N          (23)                                                        
and the total population in generation t, Nt, is calculated by   
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and the density function of ability in generation t, ft(xt), is expressed as 












.  (25) 
 
3.3 Production and government 
The model is completed by introducing the production function and the government’s 
budget constraint. We assume a CES production function: 
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where 
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 are the total efficiency units of high- and low-wage labor, respectively, 
in  generation  t.  In  a  competitive  labor  market,  the  wage  is  equal  to  the  marginal 
product of each labor: 
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Meanwhile, the government collects  its revenue solely  by taxes, and  its  budget 
constraint is expressed as 








t t G G G G T       (29)   
where  Tt,  Gt
CON, Gt
EDU, Gt
CA,  and  Gt
FA  are  the  tax  revenue  and  government’s  total 
expenditures  on  consumption,  educational  subsidy, childcare  allowance,  and  family 
allowance, respectively. They are defined as 
     Tt ≡ ηt Yt,  (30)                             
Gt




t+1,    (32) 
Gt
CA≡δtNt+1,    (33) 
Gt




4.1. Parameters, initial conditions, and scenarios 
The dynamics of our model are determined by equations (1) to (34), along with the 
given values of the parameters and the initial conditions. In simulations, we assume 
static expectations for wages; in other words, individuals expect their children’s wages 15 
 








t w w w w     1 1 ,   in equations (9), (10), (13), (17) and 
(19)). The Appendix table explains how we determined the parameter values, most of 
which roughly correspond to the actual data in Japan or those used in the preceding 
studies.   
   The model starts with generation 1, which consists of 100,000,000 individuals each 
for high- and low-wage groups. For both groups, we assume that individual ability is 
distributed normally with the mean 0.5 and the standard deviation 0.25, and remove 
those with the ability  below 0 or above 1  (whose proportion  is about 4.6% of the 
population  normally  distributed  with  no  truncation).  We  then  randomly  assign  this 
normally distributed ability to each of 100,000,000 individuals in generation 1, and let 
each individual make decisions about the number and education level of the children 
on the basis of the children’s ability. Some children receive high education and high 
wages, while others do not, resulting in different distributions of ability and income 
from those of their parents. Then, the children, or individuals in generation 2, make the 
same decisions as their parents. We repeat the same process until generation 10, taking 
into  account  intergenerational  ability  transmission.  Furthermore,  we  repeat  this 
simulation  a  hundred  times  to  take  the  averages  of  simulation  results  in  each 
generation. We will report these averages in what follows
5. 
We consider a combination of three cases (with different assumptions about ability 
transmission) and four policy scenarios to assess  the dynamic and long -run  policy 
impacts  on the ability and wage distributions, population size, per capita GDP ,  and 
income  inequality  measured  by  the  Gini  coefficient .  For  ability  transmission,  we 
consider three cases that are featured by a set of three parameters (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) in equation 
                                                   
5  All simulation results with their standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals are available from the authors 
upon request. 16 
 
(7): 
  Case 1: (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (0, 1, 0), 
  Case 2: (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (0.125, 0.75, 0.1), 
  Case 3: (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (0.25, 0.5, 0.1). 
In Case 1, ability is fully transmitted from parents to children without any disturbances, 
and its initial distribution is completely preserved in each consecutive generation. In 
Cases 2 and 3, ability is partially transmitted with the mean preserved at 0.5 in the 
steady  state  and  some  random  disturbances.  In  these  cases,  ability  becomes  more 
concentrated around the  mean—and at a  faster pace  in  Case 3 than  in Case 2—in 
successive generations. 
In each case, we analyze the effects of three policy measures, which are expressed 
as a set of three policy parameters (θ, δ, m): 
    Baseline: (θ，δ，m) = (0, 0.0225, 0.2),     
Educational subsidy: (θ，δ，m) = (0.5, 0.0225, 0.2), 
    Childcare allowance: (θ，δ，m) = (0, 0.0225+Δδ, 0.2), 
      Family allowance: (θ，δ，m) = (0, 0.0225, 0.2+Δm). 
We suppose that the government implements one of the three policy measures. For 
educational subsidy, the government subsidizes 50% of the difference in the costs of 
high  and  low  education.  For  childcare  allowance  and  family  allowance,  the 
government raises them from their baseline levels of 0.00225 and 0.2, respectively. To 
compare their effects consistently, we adjust the childcare and family allowances to 
make the income tax rate, ηt, the same across the three policies in each generation. 
More specifically, we first calculate the tax rate for educational subsidy with θ = 0.5, 
and then adjust the parameters δ and m (that is, calculate Δδ and Δm) to make the 
income  tax  rates  for  childcare  and  family  allowances  equal  to that  for  educational 17 
 
subsidy in each generation.   
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here. >> 
 
   Table 1 summarizes the evolutions of policy parameters (θ, δ, and m) and income 
tax rates (η) in generations 1, 5, and 10 for the baseline and the three policy scenarios 
in three cases of ability transmission. The top panel shows the results in Case 1 with 
full ability transmission and no disturbances. The baseline case shows that the tax rate 
remains slightly above 0.24 till generation 10. To implement the educational subsidy (θ 
= 0.5), the government needs to raise the tax rate to slightly above 0.25. It can raise 
childcare and family allowances to around 0.033 (from 0.025) and 0.21 (from 0.2), 
respectively, with the income tax rate fixed at the stated level in the case of educational 
subsidy in each generation. The middle and bottom panels summarize the results in 
Cases 2 and 3. In comparison with Case 1, the government requires slightly higher tax 
rates to finance the three policy measures. 
 
<< Insert Figure 1 about here. >> 
 
4.2 Ability distribution 
Figure 1 depicts how the distribution of ability, which obeys a normal distribution 
with a  mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of  0.25 in generation 1, turns out in 
generations 5 and 10 in the baseline and three policy scenarios, on the basis of three 
assumptions about ability transmission.
6   
                                                   
6  The density of ability distribution in Figure 1 is expressed as f5(x5) and f10(x10) given by equation (25) with t = 5 
and 10. 18 
 
The  top two  panels  of  Figure  1  depict the  results  in  Case  1  with  full  ability 
transmission with no disturbances. In generation 5, all four policy scenarios keep the 
ability distributions close to the normal distribution; however, the ability distribution 
has two cutoff points—around 0.3 and 0.45. As the generation reaches the tenth, these 
discontinuities become clearer. As the ability rises to around 0.3 from zero, the density 
of  individuals  increases  more than what the normal distribution would suggest. At 
around 0.3, it drops sharply and resumes increasing and has the third cutoff point at 
around  0.45.  Beyond  it,  the  ability  distribution  looks  closer  to  what  the  normal 
distribution would suggest and has no discontinuities.   
These  changes  in  the  ability  distribution  suggest  that  full  or  strong  ability 
transition  across  generations,  combined  with  financial  constraints  for  education,  is 
likely to increase the proportion of lower-than-average-ability individuals. This is a 
reasonable  result,  because  low-ability  individuals  tend  to  be  poor  and  face  high 
thresholds for providing their children with high education (see equation (19)). They 
tend  to  choose  a  combination  of  a  large  number  of  children  and  a  low  level  of 
education,  leading  to  an  increase  in  low-ability  individuals  in  the  subsequent 
generation. This adjustment continues in successive generations. Two things should be 
noted, however. First, the proportion of extremely low-ability individuals tends to stay 
low, because they are too poor to have even a small number of children. Second, there 
are  a  couple  of  discontinuities  in  the  ability  distribution,  reflecting  thresholds  for 
choosing high education for children as discussed in Section 4.3. 
Figure  1  compares  the  impacts  of  the  three  policy  measures  on  the  ability 
distribution as well. In contrast with the baseline and childcare and family allowances, 
educational subsidy moves the ability distribution closer to the normal distribution. It 
also  reduces  the  proportion  of  low-ability  individuals  and  raises  the  proportion  of 19 
 
high-ability individuals. There are no substantial differences among the baseline and 
childcare  and  family  allowances.  These  results  indicate  that  only  an  educational 
subsidy affects the ability distribution  by  shifting it toward the higher end. Unlike 
childcare and family allowances, educational subsidy directly enhances the incentives 
to  provide  children  with  high  education,  which  prevents  income  distribution  from 
shifting toward the lower end. However, the top panels of Figure 1 suggest that the 
impact of educational subsidy on the ability distribution is limited even up to the tenth 
generation. 
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 1 show the results  in Cases 2 and 3, 
corresponding to strong and weak ability transmission, respectively. Unlike in Case 1, 
the ability distribution is close to the normal distribution in all of the baseline and three 
policy  cases  and  it  has  no  discontinuities.  The  ability  distribution  is  dispersed  in 
generation  5  in  both  Cases  2  and  3,  but  it  converges to the  normal  distribution  in 
generation 10 for all of the baseline and three policy scenarios. We also find that the 
ability distribution concentrates around 0.5 in Case 3 more than in Case 2, a reasonable 
result given a weak degree of ability transmission in Case 3. 
In all, Figure 1 suggests that ability distribution  is  virtually  insensitive to any 
policy measures if the ability transmission is not fully or very strongly transmitted. If 
the ability is fully or very strongly transmitted, only educational subsidy can prevent 
income distribution from shifting toward the lower end, while its impact is limited in 
the short run. However, it does not mean that our policy measures do not affect income 
distribution, because income is determined not only by ability but also wages. Hence, 
the next task is to examine how the three policy measures affect wage distribution. All 
three policies provide  individuals with  financial  support to give their children  high 
education.   20 
 
 
<< Insert Figure 2 about here. >> 
 
4.3 Wage distribution 
Figure 2 presents the proportion of low-wage individuals (those who cannot receive 
high education) among those with the same ability but whose cases represent different 
degrees of ability transmission. The top two panels show the results in Case 1 with full 
ability transmission and no disturbances. As shown, there are no substantial differences 
among the baseline and childcare and family allowances, while educational subsidy 
provides quite different results from the other three policy scenarios.   
In  the  baseline  and  childcare  and  family  allowances,  there  are  three  groups  of 
individuals. The first group, located at the top-left, consists of those with ability lower 
than around 0.42. All of them obtain  low wages. The second group, located at the 
bottom-right,  consists  of  those  with  ability  higher than  around  0.45.  For them,  the 
proportion of low-wage individuals falls linearly as ability rises above that level. Third, 
there is a small group of individuals that lie between the two groups; their ability is 
somewhere between 0.42 and 0.45, and there is a negative correlation between ability 
and the proportion of low-wage individuals.   
The discontinuous relationships between ability and the proportion of  low-wage 
individuals in Case 1 are explained as follows. As seen in equation (19), generation t 
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low education and obtain low wages, regardless of their parents’ wage levels. Those 




   receive high education and (1 -xt+1) of them obtain low 








 , all of them receive low education and obtain low wages i f they are born from 
poor parents, while (1- xt+1) of them receive high education and obtain high wages if 
they are born from rich parents.   
As seen on the left chart in the top panel, childcare and family allowances have 
virtually no impact on the wage distribution, because neither of them has much effect 
on  the  threshold  for  the  choice  of  education  (see  equation  (19)).  By  contrast, 
educational subsidy lowers the threshold for high education and correspondingly gives 
low-ability individuals more chances to receive high education. As a result, children 
with ability between around 0.3 and 0.45 are then able to receive high education and 
some of them succeed in obtaining high wages. 
The right chart in the top panel illustrates what happens in generation 10. We 
observe some differences in policy impacts from generation 5. Childcare and family 
allowances succeed in engendering some shifts from the top-left group (of low-wage 
individuals) to the middle one and from the middle group to the bottom-right one (of 
high-wage individuals), with some leftward shifts of two discontinuous points. This 
indicates that these two policy measures shift the wage distribution toward the higher 
end. As in generation 5, however, educational subsidy most substantially affects the 
wage distribution. 
The middle and bottom panels present the results in Cases 2 and 3, which assume 
a partial ability transmission and disturbances. Individuals with very low ability can 
obtain  only  low  wages,  while  the  proportion  of  low-wage  individuals  declines  as 
ability rises above a certain level and there is no discontinuity, unlike in Case 1. We 22 
 
also observe that only educational subsidy can substantially reduce the proportion of 
low-wage individuals among those with low ability. 
In all, Figure 2 indicates that only educational subsidy has a substantial impact on 
the wage distribution. It reduces the threshold  for low-wage individuals to provide 
their  children  with  high  education,  leading  to  a  reduction  in  the  proportion  of 
low-ability individuals in society as a whole. Unlike the case of the ability distribution, 
educational subsidy shifts the wage distribution to the higher end even if ability is not 
fully transmitted from parents to children. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here. >> 
 
4.4 Population size, per capita GDP, and income inequality 
Finally,  we  discuss  the  impacts  of  each  policy  on  the  population  size  and  macro 
economy, which are summarized in Table 2. The top panel shows the impact on total 
population, where its initial size is normalized as 100. In all cases, total population 
decreases  with  each  new  generation,  although  the  decrease  is  entirely  due  to  the 
assumed parameters and will not necessarily occur. In all cases, we find that childcare 
allowance  is  most  effective  in  expanding  total  population,  a  reasonable  result 
considering that only childcare allowance directly reduces the cost of childrearing. The 
impact on the population size increases as the degree of ability transmission weakens, 
but the relative performance of the three policy measures remains unchanged.   
   The middle panel summarizes the impact on per capita GDP. Before assessing the 
policy impacts, we notice that per capita GDP tends to decline in Case 1, and to a 
lesser extent, Case 2, but remains almost unchanged in Case 3 in the baseline. This 
suggests that stronger ability transmission by itself tends to subdue economic growth, 23 
 
as strong ability transmission tends to increase the proportion of low-wage individuals, 
as seen from Figure 2.   
   More importantly, we find that educational subsidy is the only policy measure to 
enhance per capita GDP. This is consistent with the results in Figures 1 and 2, which 
show that only educational subsidy can both shift the ability distribution toward the 
higher end and reduce the proportion of low-wage individuals among those with low 
ability.   
   However, educational subsidy becomes less effective in raising per capita GDP as 
ability transmission weakens. This is explained by two factors. As ability transmission 
weakens, the ability distribution becomes less affected by educational subsidy (as seen 
in Figure 1), and it becomes more concentrated on the average ability, reducing the 
impact of educational subsidy on wages, which works only for low-ability individuals 
(as  seen  in  Figure  2).  We  also  find  that  enhancing  childcare  allowance  or  family 
allowance  reduces  per  capita  GDP,  although  their  impacts  decline  as  ability 
transmission becomes weaker. These policies do not raise the average level of ability 
nor reduce the proportion of low-wage individuals, confirming the welfare loss due to 
additional taxation and transfer.   
   Finally,  the  bottom  panel  compares  the  evolutions  of  the  Gini  coefficients  of 
household  income.  In  the  baseline,  we  notice  that  the  Gini  coefficient  rises  in 
succeeding generations in Case 1 while it declines in Cases 2 and 3. This confirms that 
stronger  ability  transmission  tends  to  widen  income  inequality  through  unequal 
opportunities  for  education  in  successive  generations.  Comparing  the  three  policy 
measures, we find that Policy 1 is most effective in preventing income inequality from 
widening  (in  Case  1)  or  reducing  it  (in  Cases  2  and  3),  because  it  provides 
economically disadvantaged children with more chances to receive high education.   24 
 
Judging by the results from Table 3, we can conclude that educational subsidy is a 
more  desirable  policy  measure  than  enhancing  childcare  allowance  or  family 
allowance in terms of both efficiency and equity, in that it can both raise economic 
growth and reduce income inequality most effectively, especially if ability is strongly 
transmitted between generations. In addition, by comparing Figures 1 and 2, we can 
argue that educational subsidy affects economic growth and income distribution largely 
through  its  impact  on  the  wage  distribution  rather  than  on  the  ability  distribution, 
especially if ability is not fully transmitted from parents to children. 
 
5.    Concluding remarks 
 
In this study, we have investigated how educational subsidy, childcare allowance, 
and family allowance affect economic growth and income distribution, using simulation 
models  which  incorporate  intergenerational  ability  transmission  and  endogenous 
fertility. The simulation results show that financial  support for higher education can 
both increase economic growth and reduce income inequality, especially if parent and 
child  abilities  are  closely  correlated.  In  contrast  with  educational  subsidy,  raising 
childcare  or  family  allowance  has  limited  impact on  growth  and  income  inequality. 
Furthermore,  we  find  that  educational  subsidy  affects  economic  growth  and  income 
distribution largely through its impact on the wage distribution rather than on the ability 
distribution. 
Our analysis has many limitations. For instance, the results may be more or less 
modified if heterogeneous households with different preferences, an endogenous labor 
supply, or an old-age social security system is taken into account. Despite these caveats, 
this study highlights the importance of educational subsidy in terms of both efficiency 25 
 
and equity. If ability is strongly transmitted between generations and education requires 
high  costs,  there  is  the  risk  that  education  may  sustain  or  even  amplify  income 
inequality in successive generations, due to limited opportunities for education among 
low-income  individuals.  Moreover,  the  substitution  between  child  quality  and  child 
quantity may raise the proportion of low-educated workers and depress per capita GDP 
and  economic  growth.  Financial  support  for  education  is  expected to  mitigate these 
adverse effects of education on the economy and social welfare.   
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Table 1. Assumed policy parameters and calculated wage tax rates
Baseline Educational subsidy  Childcare allowance Family allowance
Case 1: (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (0, 1, 0)
θ 0 0.5 0 0
δ 1 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225
δ 5 0.0225 0.0225 0.0330 0.0225
δ 10 0.0225 0.0225 0.0328 0.0225
m1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
m5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2099
m10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2097
η 1 0.2408 0.2408 0.2408 0.2408
η 5 0.2406 0.2506 0.2506 0.2506
η 10 0.2407 0.2506 0.2506 0.2506
Case 2: (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (0.125, 0.75, 0.1)
θ 0 0.5 0 0
δ 1 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225
δ 5 0.0225 0.0225 0.0338 0.0225
δ 10 0.0225 0.0225 0.0337 0.0225
m1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
m5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2106
m10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2105
η 1 0.2408 0.2408 0.2408 0.2408
η 5 0.2405 0.2513 0.2513 0.2513
η 10 0.2405 0.2513 0.2513 0.2513
Case 3: (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3) = (0.25, 0.5, 0.1)
θ 0 0.5 0 0
δ 1 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225 0.0225
δ 5 0.0225 0.0225 0.0346 0.0225
δ 10 0.0225 0.0225 0.0346 0.0225
m1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
m5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2113
m10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2113
η 1 0.2408 0.2408 0.2408 0.2408
η 5 0.2405 0.2520 0.2520 0.2520
η 10 0.2404 0.2520 0.2520 0.2520  29 
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Table 2. Total population, per capita GDP, and the Gini coefficient: simulation results
Case Generation
Total population (Generation 1 = 100)
Case 1 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 85.9 89.2 (3.8) 92.5 (7.6) 88.6 (3.1)
10 69.0 77.7 (12.6) 84.1 (21.8) 74.8 (8.3)
Case 2 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 84.4 88.4 (4.7) 91.3 (8.2) 87.3 (3.4)
10 65.6 75.8 (15.5) 81.4 (24.0) 71.9 (9.6)
Case 3 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 82.4 87.8 (6.6) 89.6 (8.7) 85.4 (3.7)
10 62.8 75.0 (19.5) 78.9 (25.6) 69.4 (10.5)
Per capita GDP   (Generation 1 = 100)
Case 1 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 96.9 99.2 (2.3) 95.9 (-1.1) 96.6 (-0.3)
10 95.0 97.2 (2.2) 92.8 (-2.4) 94.4 (-0.6)
Case 2 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 98.2 99.9 (1.7) 97.6 (-0.6) 97.9 (-0.3)
10 98.8 99.7 (0.9) 98.2 (-0.5) 98.6 (-0.2)
Case 3 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5 99.7 100.4 (0.7) 99.5 (-0.2) 99.6 (-0.1)
10 99.7 100.4 (0.6) 99.6 (-0.1) 99.7 (-0.0)
Gini coefficient
Case 1 1 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524
5 0.1583 0.1531 (-3.3) 0.1590 (0.4) 0.1565 (-1.1)
10 0.1636 0.1555 (-4.9) 0.1652 (1.0) 0.1629 (-0.4)
Case 2 1 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524
5 0.1375 0.1324 (-3.7) 0.1363 (-0.9) 0.1360 (-1.1)
10 0.1335 0.1306 (-2.2) 0.1324 (-0.8) 0.1317 (-1.4)
Case 3 1 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524 0.1524
5 0.1048 0.1017 (-2.9) 0.1031 (-1.6) 0.1029 (-1.8)
10 0.1038 0.1014 (-2.2) 0.1020 (-1.7) 0.1017 (-2.0)
Note: The figures in the parentheses indicate percentage differences from the baseline in each generation.
Family allowance Educational subsidy  Childcare allowance Baseline
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Appendix table. Assumed parameter values
Opportunity cost of childrearing/average after-tax income
a δ 0.5
Childcare allowance/average after-tax income
b δ  0.0225
Family allowance/average before-tax income
c m 0.2
Basic cost of childrearing/average after-tax income
d ξ 0.75
Cost of low education/average after-tax income
d e
L 0.05
Cost of high education/average after-tax income
d e
H 0.075










Utility weight on child's wage
h ʱ 1/3
Utility weight on the number of children
h β 1/3
Utility weight on own consumption
h γ 1/3 
Note:   
a.  White Paper on National Lifestyle 2005 (Cabinet Office, 2005) estimated the opportunity cost of 
childrearing to be 21.3%–82.2% of women’s lifetime income in Japan. We use 50%, close to their 
average, as the ratio of cost of childrearing to lifetime income.   
b. Useful Labor Statistics 2010 (The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training, 2010) estimated 
lifetime income to be 150–300 million yen in Japan, depending on educational attainment. On that 
basis,  we  assume  that  average  lifetime  income  is  200  million  yen.  Meanwhile,  the  Japanese 
government is now introducing a child allowance of 2.8 thousand yen per child in total (until 18 years 
old) and plans to expand it to 5.6 thousand yen. We assume the child allowance to be 4.5 thousand 
yen, close to the average and equivalent to 2.25% of the assumed lifetime income. 
c. The welfare assistance benefit per adult is equal to 840–960 thousand yen a year under the current law 
in Japan. On this basis, we assume that family allowance is one million yen, roughly equal to 20% of 
the assumed annual income of 5 million yen (= 200 million yen / 40 years). 
d. The Modern Economics of Childrearing (American International Underwriters Corporation, 2005) 
estimated the average cost of childrearing (excluding the opportunity cost), the education cost up to 
high school and that up to national university to be 16.40, 9.53, and 13.45 million yen, respectively, 
in Japan. We assume these to be 15, 10, and 15 million yen, respectively, which are equivalent to 
7.5%, 5%, and 7.5% of the assumed lifetime income. 
e.  Useful  Labor  Statistics  2010  estimated  the  average  lifetime  income  for  high  school  (or  below) 
graduates and college (or above) graduates are 220–260 and 300 million yen, respectively, in Japan. 
Hence, we assume their wage ratio to be 1.25 (=300/[(220+260)/2]), which roughly corresponds to ε 
= 0.55 (≈1.25/(1+1.25)). 
f.  National Accounts 2008 (Cabinet Office, 2010) showed that the government expenditure on services 
excluding education and medical care was 7.2 trillion in Japan. We assume it to be 10 trillion, roughly 
equivalent to 2% of GDP. 
g. Based on Hanushek et al. (2004). 
h. Tentatively assumed. 